Tracked question

Can political appointees veto U.S. federal science grants under the proposed rule?

Movement at this check

Stable since last check

The answer has held through 2 checks.

Direction shift
0/100
Agreement
0 pts vs previous check

Agreement over time

90/100
2026-07-21: 72/100 · Restated, not moved: The core conclusion remains the same: senior political appointees would gain significant (veto-like/practical veto) authority over many discretionary science grants via pre-issuance review, even after peer review. NEW adds explicit caveats on limitations by statute and scope, uses slightly softer language ('practical veto', 'effectively'), and updates the 'as of' date reference, but does not alter 2026-07-28: 90/100 · Wording and emphasis differences only (e.g., 'veto-like' vs 'effectively veto'); core conclusion, qualifications, and facts unchanged. 2026-08-04: 90/100 · No material movement 2026-08-11: 90/100 · No material movement 2026-08-18: 90/100 · No material movement 2026-08-25: 75/100 · The conclusion remains the same (appointees would have functional veto power over discretionary grants if finalized). The new text adds extra details regarding award termination powers and specific evaluation criteria (agency priorities, national interest). 2026-09-01: 90/100 · No material movement View full chart
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Sources

Position Map

Where the models stand

Each row is one part of the answer. The cards show the distinct positions; the model chips show who supports each one.

0/100 Direction Shift · Stable
Shared conclusion

Yes—if finalized substantially as proposed, political appointees could effectively veto many U.S. federal science grants. The proposal w

Shared position

Yes—if finalized substantially as proposed, political appointees could effectively veto many U.S. federal science grants. The proposal would require agencies to have senior pol

  • DeepSeek
  • OpenAI
  • Gemini
Shared conclusion

Their review could consider legal requirements, agency priorities, the national interest, and presidential policy priorities, and could form

Shared position

Their review could consider legal requirements, agency priorities, the national interest, and presidential policy priorities, and could form the basis for declining an otherwise fa

  • DeepSeek
  • OpenAI
  • Gemini
Shared conclusion

This would not formally abolish peer review or necessarily make appointees the sole scientific decision-makers.

Shared position

Supports this conclusion

  • DeepSeek
  • OpenAI
Shared conclusion

However, peer-review recommendations would remain advisory: appointees would be expected to exercise independent judgment rather than routin

Shared position

However, peer-review recommendations would remain advisory: appointees would be expected to exercise independent judgment rather than routinely defer to them.

  • DeepSeek
  • OpenAI
  • Gemini
See how each model moved across checks
Model position movement by watch date
ModelJul 21Jul 28Aug 04Aug 11Aug 18Aug 25Sep 01
OpenAI
Gemini
Grok — —
DeepSeek — — — — — —

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Consensus Watch

Run history

90/100 latest agreement
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Agreement over time

How strongly the models support the same claims. Every point links to its run below.

100 50 0 2026-07-21: 72/100 · Restated, not moved: The core conclusion remains the same: senior political appointees would gain significant (veto-like/practical veto) authority over many discretionary science grants via pre-issuance review, even after peer review. NEW adds explicit caveats on limitations by statute and scope, uses slightly softer language ('practical veto', 'effectively'), and updates the 'as of' date reference, but does not alter 2026-07-28: 90/100 · Wording and emphasis differences only (e.g., 'veto-like' vs 'effectively veto'); core conclusion, qualifications, and facts unchanged. 2026-08-04: 90/100 · No material movement 2026-08-11: 90/100 · No material movement 2026-08-18: 90/100 · No material movement 2026-08-25: 75/100 · The conclusion remains the same (appointees would have functional veto power over discretionary grants if finalized). The new text adds extra details regarding award termination powers and specific evaluation criteria (agency priorities, national interest). 2026-09-01: 90/100 · No material movement 2026-07-21 2026-09-01

Checks

Newest first. Open any saved result to read the full consensus from that date.

  1. Stable
    90/100 agreement

    No meaningful movement detected in this check.

    Open this consensus
  2. Meaningful change
    75/100 agreement

    The conclusion remains the same (appointees would have functional veto power over discretionary grants if finalized). The new text adds extra details regarding award termination powers and specific evaluation criteria (agency priorities, national interest).

    Open this consensus
  3. Stable
    90/100 agreement

    No meaningful movement detected in this check.

    Open this consensus
  4. Stable
    90/100 agreement

    No meaningful movement detected in this check.

    Open this consensus
  5. Stable
    90/100 agreement

    No meaningful movement detected in this check.

    Open this consensus
  6. Meaningful change
    90/100 agreement

    Wording and emphasis differences only (e.g., 'veto-like' vs 'effectively veto'); core conclusion, qualifications, and facts unchanged.

    Open this consensus
  7. Stable
    72/100 agreement

    Restated, not moved: The core conclusion remains the same: senior political appointees would gain significant (veto-like/practical veto) authority over many discretionary science grants via pre-issuance review, even after peer review. NEW adds explicit caveats on limitations by statute and scope, uses slightly softer language ('practical veto', 'effectively'), and updates the 'as of' date reference, but does not alter